Συνέντευξη για τον Οριενταλισμό στο 'Chinese Social Sciences Today' | Interview on Orientalism for 'Chinese Social Sciences Today' | 警惕数字景观中的“东方主义”
I had the joy of giving an interview for 'Chinese Social Sciences Today', an academic newspaper sponsored by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), a top think tank in China. Here it is:
Interview in Chinese at CSSN: https://www.cssn.cn/skgz/bwyc/202505/t20250509_5873036.shtml
In English
China Social Sciences Today (Mirong Chen, Editor): In the post-colonial era, has the discourse of Orientalism changed? As many Global South countries are trying to redefine their identities through culture, art, or academics, how do you view their attempts’ role in deconstructing and reshaping Orientalist discourse? Do you think there is a risk of “Reverse Orientalism”?
Yet are we indeed in a properly post-colonial era? Case in point: I originally come from a country, Greece, which is nominally independent and sovereign. Yet its public discourse is inundated with proclamations that ‘Greece belongs to the West’ (a phrase of Cold-War-era pedigree, but also a long history before that) and that Greek governments should strive to ‘turn Greece into a properly European country’, whatever that might mean in today’s world — while anthropologist Michael Herzfeld offers interesting angles to this by speaking of ‘crypto-colonialism’ and applying it to Greece specifically, inter alia. These proclamations and geo-cultural identity wars are exceedingly impactful on the sphere of politics and policy, and were supremely weaponised during Greece’s government-debt crisis during the last decade in order to shape political decisions; Orientalism and self-Orientalisation abound in the country, which is in essence absolutely terrified at the very prospect of considering its position in a coming world without ‘colonies’ of various kinds.
Thus, by way of this very Greek example, while the classical discourse of Orientalism might have evolved in the current era, its underlying power dynamics and representational issues continue to manifest in various forms even within ‘the West’. It is true that quasi-colonial configurations are not living their brightest days and that their long-term, future prospects are grim due to the sheer magnitude of tectonic shifts in global affairs — yet this is not to say that these configurations are not presently active and impactful, particularly in the cultural sphere. Indeed, Europe itself as a whole is a prime example. It one approaches the current Euro-Atlantic tensions apropos the Ukraine war’s ending from this lens, it is indeed ironic that Europe’s former colonial powers face immense difficulties in negotiating and accepting the prospect of the end, or at least transformation, of their own geopolitical colonisation to their American erstwhile partners.
Shifting global power dynamics change the calculus completely. While during Edward Said’s times (and particularly with the privilege of hindsight of the post-Cold-War short unipolar moment) one iteration of ‘the West’ was still the dominant paradigm, with peoples and states striving to reclaim their own voices after historical colonialism proper vis-à-vis both an external and an internalised ‘West’, the era lying ahead of us is substantially different. The demographic, economic, technological, productive, political, geopolitical, and cultural ascendance of the Global South, with civilisational states as its main nodes, gradually engenders a multipolar world and reality in which it will simply make no sense to anxiously negotiate one’s own cultural and collectively political identity vis-à-vis ‘the West’ in an Orientalist, self-Orientalising, or post-colonial gesture anymore. Not to mention that ‘the West’ itself is currently undergoing a crisis of identity and (re-)definition in the midst of the rupture of the Euro-Atlantic narrative on identity, a rupture that may be existentially exasperated after the United Nation’s International Court on Justice adjudicates on Israel’s genocide in Gaza, a coming development with profound and often overlooked implications. These things take time, since apparently ‘the West’s’ cultural soft power is more resilient than its actual hard power, yet the writing is on the wall.
You perceptively raise the point whether there is a risk of ‘reverse Orientalism’, i.e., Occidentalism. Yet Orientalism is, perhaps first and foremost, a form of power and control — presupposing the structures and (any kind of) colonial context in which it emerges and is instrumentalised and weaponised, otherwise it makes limited sense. Interestingly, there is a very different kind of ‘inverse Orientalism’ that we see developing in ‘the West’. When Westerners look at the ascendance of the Global South and of civilisational states like China, they often fear that these new powers will inevitably aspire to an offensive and threatening form of global hegemony, because the situation is assessed by Westerners on the basis of the Anglo-Saxon precedents of the British Empire and of the United States of America. If Orientalism represents and depicts ‘non-Westerners’ as alien, exotic, and profoundly different, here we see its inversion: ‘Westerners’ simply not being able to fathom the very possibility that ‘non-Westerners’ might be indeed different, that they might indeed not desire to exercise their new global status in the oppressive way characteristic of modern Anglo-American history, for the simple reason that deep and different civilisational paradigms and, as such, priorities are at play. Now, that’s an inversion of Orientalism indeed…
China Social Sciences Today: Homi Bhabha put forward the concept of hybridity to refer to the creation of new transcultural forms within the contact zone produced by colonization. In the context of globalization, is Orientalism being replaced by a new cultural hybridity that truly breaks the East-West antagonism or just masks the inequality of power?
Identities and cultural forms are, I think, either way in constant flux and redefinition, even if certain foundational civilisational characteristics remain discernible even over millennia. Usually, I like to focus on the umbilical cord connecting forms of Orientalism in cultural identity to global power dynamics, as the former depend on the latter like plants depend on water: should the latter change, the former will inevitably change as well, even after a certain amount of time. If I understand it correctly, the crux of your question concerns the ‘East-West antagonism’. (By the way, in speaking about the ‘inequality of power’ between ‘East’ and ‘West’ today, the speaker ought to clarify which side is indeed ‘more powerful’ and which is ‘less powerful’, as this is anything but a given today, and varies by the metrics one focuses on. I believe that the outcome of the Ukraine war has gone a long way in forcing the balance on this, be that as it may.) If ‘the beginning of education is the examination of names’, as the classical Greeks would claim, then we could start by these very words, ‘East’ and ‘West’. Just before, we were discussing about ‘the Global South’, not about ‘the East’; is, perhaps, a vocabulary of ‘Global South’ and ‘Global North’ —with the Russian Federation occupying a liminal space, a ‘Southerner’ in a Northern geography— more up-to-date than the outdated ‘East and West’? Here we return to the difference between actual geography and the ideas and narratives projected onto geography, e.g., as studied by critical geopolitics — for instance, ‘the Middle East’ as a term simply betrays the position of the European, and British, observer, in contrast to the neutral geographical notion of ‘Western Asia’. It is ‘the West’ itself that is perhaps the most malleable of these seemingly geographic, geo-cultural notions. What is ‘the West’, among all possible options on the table? Is this the Euro-Atlantic ‘West’ of NATO? The European, post-NATO ‘West’ without the US, as is being currently discussed? The long-gone, back-then-soon-to-be globalised West of Fukuyama’s ‘End of History’, an idea that did not age well? ‘The West’ of Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilisations’? Historically, the European-Mediterranean historical West of the Roman Empire, the Western European Carolingian West, colonialism’s ‘West’ in the modern era, the Cold War’s ‘West’ of the ‘free world’? The European, post-NATO ‘West’ without the US under President Trump, as is being currently hypothetically discussed? A scrutiny of the differing itineraries of notions such as ‘West’, ‘Abendland’, and ‘Occident’ would be revealing here — and it is indeed difficult to use such wobbly terms as analytical tools in today’s era, particularly when one considers them as having a set and given semantic content.
Whatever ‘the West’ might be, however, one thing is for certain. A period of about two centuries is currently in the process of expiring, in which the gravitational centre of global power (economic, political, cultural) was on the shores of the Atlantic Ocean — first with the British Empire, and then with the United States of America. If one zooms out and looks at history proper, this period was a historical aberration: the only time in history, spanning just two centuries, in which the gravitational epicentre of global economic, political, civilisational power was not in the Eurasian continent but on its periphery. In many ways, what is now swiftly returning is historical normalcy, rather than a wholly new era.
These mighty shifts are destined to radically reshape cultural and identity processes in the decades to come, hence I opted to focus on highlighting these shifts rather than to immediately jump to conclusions on the future whereabouts of cultural and identity processes in the world presently taking shape.
China Social Sciences Today: With the popularization of digital media and social networks, what shifts have taken place to the discourse and dissemination of Orientalism? Has the algorithmic recommendation mechanism of social media and search engines further reinforced Orientalist stereotypes?
Orientalism, however defined, is premised on the dissemination of representations — and particularly on the dissemination of representations as natural and given, not as one option among many. In this context, it goes without saying that digital media and social networks are by definition a prime arena for thriving Orientalist representations.
Of course, algorithms do not grow on trees; they are set and decided upon by people, whose bias might be conscious, ideological, and programmatic or unconscious and casual yet still there, which again brings the calculus of power into the discussion. Thus, I believe that this is also contingent upon all the other themes we have briefly explored.
Yet apart from the initial human, ‘manual’ set-up of algorithm configuration, what further complicates the picture is their function as a self-fulfilling prophecy after their initial set-up, thus rendering their Orientalist discourse more pervasive, insidious, and resilient. Such algorithms are designed to maximise user engagement, often by reinforcing existing beliefs and preferences. This can lead to the amplification of Orientalist stereotypes, as users are more likely to engage with content that aligns with their preconceived notions — you inadvertently teach the algorithm to offer you more of what you would expect simply by engaging with it. For instance, if a user tends to view ‘the East’ as exotic or mysterious, the algorithm may prioritise content that perpetuates these stereotypes, creating a feedback loop that further reinforces Orientalist representations even beyond the intentions of the algorithm’s designers. Moreover, the opacity of these algorithms means that users are often unaware of how their perceptions are being shaped. This covert nature of algorithmic influence makes it particularly insidious, as it operates under the guise of neutrality and objectivity. The result is a more subtle but equally impactful form of Orientalism that is embedded in the very fabric of digital media.
The medium itself —i.e., social networks and their viral dynamics, characterised by brevity, sensationalism, and visual dominance— privileges reductive imagery over nuanced cultural articulation, leading to the reconstitution of Orientalist tropes in novel yet fundamentally familiar guises. It is, therefore, not merely a question of whether digital media reinforce Orientalism, but rather how they recalibrate its modalities and extend its reach.
China Social Sciences Today: What’s your opinion about Orientalist elements in virtual reality and online games? How have algorithms influenced people’s perception into the East, and is this technology-driven Orientalism more covert and impactful?
I believe it is indeed the case, as you imply, that a particularly salient arena in which Orientalist discourse finds fertile ground is that of virtual reality and online gaming. The realm of digital entertainment frequently constructs ‘the East’ as an aestheticised spectacle — an ephemeral fantasy realm, more a figment of Western imagination than an authentic cultural space. Whether it be the invocation of the ‘mystical Orient’ in role-playing games, the hyper-stylised caricatures of East Asian warriors, or the reductive binarism of ‘Eastern wisdom’ versus ‘Western rationality’, such representations do not exist in a vacuum. They are inextricably bound to the historical evolution of Orientalist thought and its contemporary permutations. This is further compounded by the narrative structures of many games, which cast Eastern settings as the backdrop for Western protagonists or present East-West interactions within the well-worn frameworks of conquest, tutelage, or inscrutability. That these digital landscapes are consumed by global audiences —including those from the very cultures being depicted— further complicates the discourse, as players internalise representations that may bear little resemblance to lived realities.
Returning to algorithms, what we have here is a dual Orientalisation: one designed, consciously or inadvertently, by the algorithm’s actual human designers, and one further reinforced by the sheer mechanism of the algorithm as it progresses, due to the logic of algorithmic recommendation systems operating through engagement maximisation, privileging content that aligns with pre-existing biases and user behaviour. This discloses the purported nature of algorithms as ostensibly neutral arbiters of information as a foundational lie. As such, stereotypical depictions of ‘the East’, or rather of the ‘non-Western’ however defined —whether through curated news, entertainment, or social media trends— are not merely repeated but amplified, engendering digital echo chambers of cultural misrepresentation. The invisibility of these processes renders them all the more insidious; whereas traditional Orientalist narratives could be critiqued as conscious constructs, algorithmic biases are often embedded within systems that present themselves as impartial.
This phenomenon of ‘technology-driven Orientalism’ is marked by its subtlety, but also by its deep structural entrenchment. Unlike its nineteenth-century antecedents, which largely operated through explicit colonialist discourse, the contemporary iteration manifests in the seemingly innocuous recommendations of a search query, or the preferential ranking of particular images, or the selective suppression of actual ‘non-Western’ narratives. The extent to which such technologies shape perceptions of the Global South for ‘Western’ audiences is, therefore, not simply a question of content but of access — of what is surfaced, what is omitted, and what patterns of visibility are algorithmically inscribed into the digital landscape.
As regards the representations of China in particular, it is interesting (and somewhat hilarious) to observe the sheer shock of American youngsters at indirectly engaging with Chinese life for the first time ever during the short tenure of RedNote rather than TikTok as the app of choice in the US during the latter platform’s recent tumultuous days; countless perceptive papers in the social sciences could be based on the events and reactions during that short period of time...
In Chinese
【理响中国】警惕数字景观中的“东方主义”
2025-05-09 作者：陈密容 来源：中国社会科学网-中国社会科学报
本报记者 陈密容
在海外互联网平台油管（YouTube）上拥有数千万粉丝的美国视频博主IShowSpeed（中文昵称“甲亢哥”）近期的中国之行引发全球热议。有观点认为，通过真实、即时的直播体验，“甲亢哥”不仅向世界展示了当代中国的多元面貌，还以“去滤镜化”的叙事方式挑战了西方长期建构的“东方主义”框架。但与此同时，在算法的推波助澜下，一种更微妙但影响力不容小觑的“东方主义”形式已悄然进入数字媒体结构之中。
“东方主义”这一概念由著名文学批评家爱德华·萨义德（Edward Said）在其1978年出版的著作《东方学》中首次系统提出。萨义德指出，“东方主义”是一种西方人藐视东方文化、任意虚构东方文化的偏见性思维方式或认识体系，借由文学、艺术、学术等形式，强化东西方对立，将东方刻画为神秘、落后、专制的简单形象，以合理化西方的文化优越感和殖民统治。这种建构及论述与东方国家的真实面貌几乎毫无关系。在全球化浪潮与数字化背景下，“东方主义”的表现形式正在经历怎样的演变？围绕相关问题，本报记者近日采访了英国伦敦大学学院人类学系研究员索迪里斯·米特拉雷西斯（Sotiris Mitralexis）。
权力关系和表征问题继续存在
《中国社会科学报》：当今时代，“东方主义”话语是否发生了变化？许多“全球南方”国家尝试通过文化、艺术和学术重新定义自身身份，这些努力对“东方主义”话语的解构与重构产生了何种影响？
米特拉雷西斯：我来自希腊，一个独立的主权国家。但是，这个国家的公共话语不乏“希腊属于西方”“希腊政府应努力将希腊发展成正统的欧洲国家”等论调。美国哈佛大学人类学系荣休教授迈克尔·赫兹菲尔德（Michael Herzfeld）曾用“隐性殖民主义”这一概念来分析一些国家如何因坚持最基本的民族独立而遇到不利的局面，这种不利的局面通常是西方殖民势力造成的。诸如“希腊属于西方”等观念在政治和政策领域影响深远，并在希腊遭遇债务危机期间被当作意识形态武器使用，深刻影响了政治决策。“东方主义”与“自我东方化”在希腊并不罕见，有人甚至对希腊在未来无任何形式殖民主义的世界中的位置感到无所适从。
通过希腊这个例子，我想表明，“东方主义”的传统话语正在发生演变，但其潜在的权力关系和表征问题仍继续在西方内部以各种形式存在。的确，类殖民主义形态已经衰落，因全球局势发生巨大变化，其未来也不太可能重新得势。但这并不意味着类殖民主义形态不再活跃、毫无影响力，尤其在文化领域更非如此。如果从这个角度分析当前跨大西洋两岸地区的关系，我们会发现，殖民势力难以接受欧洲无法再像过去那样在美洲进行地缘政治殖民活动这一现实。
全球力量格局发生了深刻转变。在萨义德生活的时代，“西方”这一范式曾占据主导地位，许多国家及其人民在奋力夺回殖民主义背景下被抹去的声音。然而，我们即将迎来的时代却大不相同。以文明型国家为重要支点的“全球南方”在政治、经济、科技、文化和人才方面的崛起逐渐催生了一个日益多极化的世界。在这样的世界中，再以“东方主义”“自我东方化”或后殖民的姿态焦虑地就自身的文化和集体政治身份与西方进行谈判，将毫无意义。更不用说，西方自身目前正处于身份认同和（再）定义的危机之中。事物的演进需要时间，尽管“西方”的文化软实力可能比其实际的硬实力更具韧性，但大势已经很明朗了。
“东方主义”首先且最重要的特点是，它是权力与控制的一种体现。值得关注的是，在西方还出现了一种“逆向东方主义”。当西方人看到“全球南方”国家尤其是像中国这样的文明型国家崛起时，他们会担心这种新兴力量不可避免地追求具有进攻性和威胁性的全球霸权，因为他们正是基于盎格鲁-撒克逊模式来评估这种情况的。如果说“东方主义”将非西方人描绘为异类的、外来的和与西方人截然不同的，那么在这里我们看到了它的反面——这些西方人无法理解非西方人是如此不同，无法理解当非西方人在全球格局中扮演新角色时，确实没有意愿重复英美现代历史中的压迫方式，因为他们有着不同的文明范式和优先事项。
历史转变重塑文化与身份认同
《中国社会科学报》：当代后殖民理论家霍米·巴巴（Homi Bhabha）提出的“杂糅”理论强调文化之间的交融与再创造。在全球化背景下，您认为“东方主义”是否正在被一种新的文化杂糅所取代？这种杂糅是否真正打破了东西方二元对立，还是仅仅掩盖了权力不平等？
米特拉雷西斯：我认为，虽然某些基础性的文明特征数千年来依旧存续，但身份和文化形式处于不断变化和重新定义之中。我通常倾向于关注将文化认同中的“东方主义”形式与全球力量格局联系起来的“脐带”，因为前者需要依赖后者，就像植物依赖水一样。如果后者发生变化，前者也必然会在一段时间后发生变化。在谈论“东西方之间的权力不平等”时，我们应澄清哪一方“更强大”、哪一方“较弱”，因为这不是一个既定的事实，而取决于评价体系。我们可以从“东方”和“西方”这两个词汇入手。
这涉及实际地理概念与观念和叙事所反映的地理概念之间的差异。正如批判地缘政治研究表明的那样，“中东”一词暴露了欧洲观察者的立场，与“西亚”这一中立地理概念形成对比。在这些与地理和地缘文化相关的概念中，“西方”本身或许就是个极具可塑性的概念。“西方”到底是什么？是北大西洋公约组织所指的“西方”，抑或“后北约时代”美国可能“退群”的“西方”？是弗朗西斯·福山（Francis Fukuyama）“历史终结论”中提到的当时即将步入全球化的“西方”？是塞缪尔·亨廷顿（Samuel Huntington）“文明冲突论”中的“西方”？是历史上罗马帝国的地中海意义上的“西方”、欧洲加洛林王朝时期的“西方”、现代殖民主义的“西方”或者冷战期间所谓“自由世界”的“西方”？一个术语在不同语境下的语义是不一样的。
无论“西方”是什么，有一件事是确定的——一个持续大约两个世纪的时期如今正在结束。在这一时期，全球力量的中心位于大西洋沿岸——先在英国，其后在美国。如果从历史的角度来看，这个时期是反常的，世界经济、政治、文明力量的中心罕见地在亚欧大陆的边缘一角或不在亚欧大陆，且仅仅持续两个世纪。某种程度上，现在亚欧大陆的复兴符合历史常态，而不是一种全新的趋势。这些巨大的转变注定要在未来几十年中重塑文化与身份认同的过程。
“东方主义”在信息时代“换汤不换药”
《中国社会科学报》：随着数字媒体和社交网络的普及，“东方主义”的话语和传播方式发生了哪些变化？在社交媒体和搜索引擎的算法推荐机制中，“东方主义”的刻板印象是否被进一步强化，又呈现出哪些特点？
米特拉雷西斯：无论如何定义，“东方主义”都建立在表征的传播之上，特别是对被视作自然、既定的表征加以传播。
作为媒介的社交网络以简洁、吸引眼球和视觉主导为特征，优先考虑简化的图像而非细致入微的文化表达，以达到快速传播的目的。这导致“东方主义”的陈词滥调以看似新颖的形式卷土重来。因此，问题不仅是数字媒体是否强化了“东方主义”，而是它们如何重新“校准”其模式并扩大其影响力。
当然，算法不是凭空产生的，它们由人类设置和决定，这些设计者的偏见既可能是有意识、有计划、带有意识形态色彩的，也可能是无意识、随意的，但这些偏见再次凸显了权力的问题。
除了初始、人为的手动算法设置外，在初始设置后算法作为“自我实现的预言”的功能让问题变得更为复杂，从而使“东方主义”话语更加普遍、隐蔽和持续。这些算法旨在最大限度地提高用户参与度，往往通过强化现有信念和偏好来实现。这有可能强化“东方主义”的刻板印象，因为用户更有可能与符合其先入之见的内容互动，即在无意中训练算法提供更多符合自己期望的内容。例如，如果用户倾向于将“东方”视为外来的或神秘的，算法可能会优先展示这些延续刻板印象的内容，形成一种反馈循环，从而进一步强化“东方主义”的表征，甚至偏离算法设计者原本的意图。
此外，这些算法的不透明性意味着用户可能并未意识到他们的观念是如何被塑造的。算法影响力的隐蔽性使其格外难以察觉，因为它可能在中立和客观的伪装下运作。结果是，一种更微妙但同样颇具影响力的“东方主义”形式被嵌入在数字媒体的结构之中。
识别技术驱动下的“双重东方主义”
《中国社会科学报》：您如何看待虚拟现实和网络游戏中“东方主义”的映射？在您看来，算法如何塑造人们对东方的认知，这种技术驱动的“东方主义”是否比传统形式更具隐蔽性或影响力？
米特拉雷西斯：我认为“东方主义”话语在虚拟现实和网络游戏中找到了肥沃的土壤。数字娱乐领域常将“东方”建构为一种美学化的景象，这是一个充满短暂幻想的领域，更多是西方想象的产物而非真实的文化空间。无论是在角色扮演游戏中对“神秘东方”的召唤和对东亚战士的风格化漫画描绘，还是“东方智慧”与“西方理性”的简化二元论，这些表征都不是凭空存在的，它们与“东方主义”思想的演变及其当代变体有着不可分割的联系。许多游戏的叙事结构进一步强化了这一点，这些游戏将东方背景作为西方主角的衬托，在征服、庇护或奇异的框架内呈现东西方互动。这些数字景观被全球观众消费，包括东方观众。这进一步使“东方主义”话语复杂化，因为玩家将其表征内化，而这些表征与现实没有多少相似之处。
回到算法问题，我们在这里看到的是“双重东方主义”：一种由算法的人类设计者有意识或无意识地设计；另一种在算法系统的迭代中逐渐强化，显示了算法推荐系统的逻辑：通过最大化提升用户参与度，优先展示符合现存偏见和用户行为的内容。这揭示了算法是所谓“信息中立仲裁者”的说法是一个谎言。因此，无论是通过策划的新闻、娱乐还是社交媒体趋势，对“东方”或“非西方”的刻板描绘不仅得到复制而且得以放大，导致相关文化在“数字回音室”中被歪曲。这些过程的不可见性使它们更加隐蔽。传统的“东方主义”叙事被批判成有意识构造的产物，算法偏见则往往被嵌入看似公正的系统内。
“技术驱动的东方主义”现象以微妙性为标志，同时也具有根深蒂固的结构性。与19世纪主要通过显性殖民主义话语运转的方式不同，当代“东方主义”话语的迭代表现为看似无害的搜索查询建议、特定图像的优先展示或真实的“非西方”叙事被选择性隐藏。这塑造了“西方”观众对“全球南方”的认知，不仅是一个内容问题，更是一个内容访问问题——什么被呈现，什么被省略，何种可见性模式被算法嵌入数字景观之中。
审核：李建军
报纸编辑：陈禹同
网络编辑：赛音
转载请注明来源：中国社会科学网【编辑：陈禹同（报纸）赛音（网络）】
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